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JUSTICE COURT PRACTICE BY THE LAITY
By Max D. Melville of the Denver Bar
HE editor of Dicta has asked whether or not persons not
licensed to practice law in Colorado have the right to
appear in behalf of others in justices' courts. The
answer to this depends upon two factors: First, whether practice in such a court is practice of law, and, second, if so,
whether the prohibition against practice by unlicensed persons
is effective only as to practice in courts of record. In the
opinion of the writer, the first question must be answered in
the affirmative, and the second in the negative.
Before proceeding further, it should be said that undoubtedly anyone has the right to appear without an attorney and
prosecute or defend a case in which he has an interest directly
personal to him, whether his appearance be in a court of
record or in justice court; but it should be added that this right
or privilege cannot be claimed either by one who is merely an
assignee for the purpose of suit-such as a bill collector -for
that would be an evasion, or by one who appears purely in a
representative capacity-such as an executor or administrator
-for such a one does not possess the necessary direct personal
interest. In Re Otterness, 232 N. W. (Minn.) 318.
Further, a corporation, whether suing or defending in
behalf of others or of itself, cannot appear in court without
an attorney, for a corporation is incapable of personal appearance in court (Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo.
586), and a corporation cannot practice law even though the
actual work is done by licensed attorneys. People v. Painless
Parker,85 Colo. 304; Johnson-Olmstead Co. v. Denver, 1 P.
(2d) 928; Re Otterness, supra; People v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 176 N. E. (Ill.) 901.
Seemingly, it cannot seriously be contended that practice
in justice court does not constitute practice of law, even though
within a narrower field than in courts of record. Having
made the world brighter on numerous occasions for spectators,
court attaches, and justices, by falling ignominiously into every
pitfall dug by his legal adversary, no earthly court could convince this writer that such practice is not practice of law, and
a technical one at that.
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However, there is sounder authority to the point. It has
been held recently that one who, though not licensed to practice law, instituted and prosecuted suits before a justice of the
peace was guilty of contempt of the supreme court for intruding into the office of an attorney and pretending to act under
the sanction and authority of such supreme court; and that
this was true even though such intruder told no one that he
was an attorney at law, and even though the justice, sheriff,
and constables with whom he did business knew he was not an
attorney, since, as the court said, the charge was not that he
deceived or defrauded anyone by his unlawful pretensions,
but that he indulged in them. In Re Morse, 98 Vt. 45, 126
Atl. 550.
Assuming, then, that such a one is practicing law, it must
follow that when he holds himself out generally as being willing and qualified to represent the rights of others in justice
courts, he is holding himself out as qualified to practice law
and is thereby deceiving the public; and it must be remembered that the fundamental reason for the licensing of attorneys is for the protection of the public in order that it may not
be imposed upon by the incompetent or unscrupulous. People
v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671.
Does prohibition against unlicensed practice apply only
to practice in courts of record? It is the common impression,
among laymen and lawyers alike, that it does; but, in the
opinion of the writer, this assumption is erroneous and is based
upon a fallacy.
It arises undoubtedly in this way: Sections 5997 and
6017, Compiled Laws of 1921, both refer to practice in courts
of record, and the latter section states that any unlicensed person who advertises, represents, or holds himself out in any
manner as an attorney, attorney at law, or counselor at law,
or who appears on behalf of others in courts of record, shall
be deemed guilty of contempt of the Supreme Court. If that
section is valid, it inferentially would follow that, a justice
court not being a court of record, anyone can practice in such
a court.
The writer believes, however, that the section is a clumsy
attempt to define the practice of law, and also is invalid as an
attempted invasion of the rights of the judicial branch of our
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government in that it assumes to fix the limits of the Supreme
Court's control of the practice of law. It presumes to deprive
the Court of its inherent and plenary power to pass upon the
qualifications of, and to license or refuse to license, those wishing to practice law, and to discipline masqueraders in the ranks
of its officers.
By the Constitution of Colorado the Supreme Court is
given "a general superintending control over all inferior
courts." Art. 6, §2. A justice's court clearly would come
within the category of courts over which the Supreme Court
has such a control, even though it may be debatable Whether
such a court, since the amendment of section I of article 6 in
1912, is still a constitutional tribunal. CourtrightPub. Co. v.
Bray, 67 Colo. 588, 591. And, certainly, the question of who
may practice in these "inferior courts" is an important consideration in the scheme of things.
"True," said Mr. Justice Burke in Kolkman v. People,
89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575, 585, "said 'control' is to be exercised
'under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed
by law.' But since the two articles must be construed together
the 'law' referred to must not usurp judicial powers. To determine what powers properly belong to the judicial department one must go to the common law."
Going to the common law, we find that it was well settled,
according to the Supreme Court of the United States, "by the
rules of practice of common law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed." Ex Parte Secomb, 19 How. 9, 15
L. ed. 565.
In upholding its inherent and exclusive power to control
practice of the law, the supreme court of Wisconsin, in State
v. Cannon, 199 Wis. 401, has put it thus:
"The power to protect courts and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice in them was fully established in the former
decision of the court in this case (196 Wis. 534), where it was held that when
the people by means of the Constitution established courts, they became endowed with all judicial powers essential to carry out the judicial functions
delegated to them. The courts established by the Constitution have the powers
which are incidental to or which inhere in judicial bodies, unless those powers
are expressly limited by the Constitution. But the Constitution makes no
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attempt to catalogue the powers granted. It is the groundwork upon which
the superstructure of government is raised by the exercise of those powers
which are essential to carry out the functions imposed upon each department
of government. These powers are known as incidental, implied, or inherent
powers, all of which terms are used to describe those powers which must necessarily be used by the various departments of government in order that they
may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon them by the people . . .
When the public framed the constitution creating courts those judicial tribunals were endowed with the inherent power to admit and disbar attorneys-a power which was generally exercised by the courts at the time the constitution was framed and generally recognized as one of the powers essential to the
performance of the judicial duties imposed upon the courts."

Unfortunately, the governor and legislature of Wisconsin
have strenuously doubted the soundness of this position of the
court, for, in 1931, the lawmaking body passed, and the governor approved, an act purporting to restore to Mr. Cannon the
license previously revoked by the court. The outcome of this
conflict remains to be seen, but interesting comments on the
situation will be found in the September and October issues of
the American Bar Association Journal.
Perhaps the most exhaustive historical analysis of the
matter is found in Re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R.

A. 519, decided in 1899. The principles there announced have
recently been reaffirmed by the Illinois supreme court in
People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 176 N. E. 901,

where it maintained its right to punish unlicensed persons. It
is there said:
"This court has exercised original jurisdiction of applications for admission to the bar of this state and in numerous cases has entertained original proceedings for disbarment. It is argued that this proceeding is not of that
character-that the exercise by this court of original jurisdiction to disbar an
attorney is based upon the fact that the attorney is an officer of the court and
so this court obtains jurisdiction over him by virtue of having licensed him
to practice as such-whereas the court acquires no such jurisdiction with respect to persons who are not so licensed. We believe that such a contention
is entirely untenable. Having inherent and plenary power and original jurisdiction to decide who shall be admitted to practice in this state, and to license
those who may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not measure up to
the standards or come within the provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows
that this court has all the power and jurisdiction necessary to protect and
enforce its rules and decisions in that respect. Having power to determine
who shall and who shall not practice law in this state, and to license those who
may act as attorneys and forbid others who do not measure up to the standards
or come within the provisions of its rules, it necessarily follows that this court
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has the power to enforce its rules and decisions against offenders, even though
they have never been licensed by this court. Of what avail is the power to
license in the absence of power to prevent one not licensed from practicing
as an attorney? In the absence of power to control or punish unauthorized
persons who presume to practice as attorneys and officers of the court, the
power to control admissions to the bar would be nugatory. And so it has been
held that the court, which alone has power to license attorneys, has, as a
necessary corollary, ample implied power to protect this function by punishing
unauthorized persons for usurping the privilege of acting as attorneys. In Re
Morse, 98 Vt. 84, 126 Att. 550."

That the Supreme Court of Colorado considers that it has
exclusive powers with respect to rules of practice and procedure is shown by numerous decisions, the most recent and
most interesting of which is Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8,
300 Pac. 575, in which-although strictly speaking, the legislative enactment was not before it-the court in reality declared unconstitutional the attempt of the legislature, by chapter 132, Sess. L. 1931, amending section 444 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, to nullify Supreme Court Rule 14b, permitting trial judges to comment upon the evidence.
True, two of the justices dissented so vigorously and with
such a violent effect on their brother justices, that if the state
record for concurring and dissenting opinions was not broken,
it was at least crippled; but the unmistakable fact remains that
the Court served notice on the legislature that it would brook
no interference with what it considers its inherent and plenary
rights.
The remaining question to be considered, then, is whether
the Court has manifested in any way that it might overrule any
legislative fiat attempting to give unlicensed persons the right
to practice law in any court over which the Supreme Court has
a superintending control.
The answer is that the Court already has displayed its conviction that it is bound by no statute assuming to give unlicensed persons the privilege of practicing in certain phases
of the work of a court of record. Section 6020 of the Compiled Laws of 1921 reads:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to prevent any male
citizen over the age of 21 years, of good moral character, from practicing
as an attorney in the county courts of this state, while sitting for probate
business, without having obtained a license as an attorney as provided herein."
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This statute has been on the books since Colorado attained statehood, and if there were anything to the theory
that, by surrendering for many years to the legislative department a part of its rule-making power, the Court had waived
its right to exercise its inherent powers, certainly here is a
striking example.
A recent investigation demonstrated that, under the foregoing statute, unlicensed persons have been permitted to practice as "probate attorneys" for more than 50 years. Yet, in
1929, the Court adopted Rule 83d, reading: "The present
rules prohibiting the practice of law by those not thereto
licensed shall hereafter apply to practice in probate." And
the significant thing is that the Court did not refer to the
present "statutes" or "laws" relative to unlawful practice, but
referred to the "present rules"-that is, to its own enactments.
And finally, in the opinion of the writer, the Court has
voiced its opinion that it controls practice in justice courts as
fully as in courts of record, and has said in effect, although,
perhaps, not in such unmistakable terms as might be desirable, that none except licensed attorneys may practice before
justices of the peace. Supreme Court Rule 83c, passed in
1929, reads:
"Neither disbarred attorneys nor persons whose applications for examination or admission have been rejected for their failure to show good character,
will be permitted to practice as attorneys in any justice of the peace or other
court in this state."

Manifestly, one whose license has been cancelled, or one
who has been rejected for a license, would not be within the
jurisdiction of the Court if the sole test of that tribunal's right
to regulate practice of the law were whether or not the offender was one of its officers. But, by the foregoing rule the
Court has announced that it will discipline such persons if
they attempt to practice in justice courts.
So, after all, the test must be as to the fitness of the practitioner to be entrusted with the protection of the legal concerns of others; and the only method by which anyone may
have that fitness tested, and his qualifications, moral and educational, approved, is prescribed in detail in 15 pages of the
rules of the Supreme Court.
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Theoretically, at least, any person who has not had the
stamp of approval placed upon his fitness to advise others and
act for them with respect to their legal affairs, must be deemed
conclusively to be unfit; and hence such a one cannot practice
law on behalf of others in any court in this state, whether a
court of record or a justice court, even though, in the words
of Mr. Justice Belford, "his talents may not be inferior to
those of a Webster or a Choate."
The present interest in this subject has arisen because of
the many complaints of abuse of process in justice courts by
collection agencies, whose non-lawyer members prosecute suits
through all stages. Attachment and garnishment writs unquestionably have been converted into bludgeons of oppression
by those agencies. One instance given the writer by one of
the Denver justices showed that in attempting to collect a
$12.50 debt, the collection agent had run four garnishments
within as many weeks, had piled up costs of $17, had extracted
but $8 from the debtor's wages, and had left the debtor, at
the end of the session, owing $12.60, or $9 more than at the
beginning.
And yet, in all fairness, it must be said that unethical
practices in the collection of accounts are not confined to laymen. In the December issue of Dicta was printed an insidious
and slimy "Disclaimer of Liability"-as brazen an instrument as can be imagined-inferentially threatening a debtor
with loss of position and injury to prestige, credit standing,
reputation, and influence. It was signed by the "Legal Division" of a stores company, and that "Legal Division" is a
licensed attorney at law.
We cannot criticize unlicensed practitioners too freely
when our own garments are by no means free of stain. In the
words of the South Dakota supreme court:
"Attorneys should never forget that they are officers of the court; that
justice under the law is all that their clients are entitled to and all that they
have a right to seek for them; that theirs is an honorable profession whose
true votaries never try to justify their acts on the old saw, 'The end justifies
the means.' The collection of claims is a legitimate field of work; but it is a
sad commentary on the legal profession that there are attorneys who are willing
to resort to any and all means to make collections, knowing that there are
many creditors who care little the means that are used by their collectors so
long as the desired end is gained."

